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Summary
Pakistan is a key front-line ally in the U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalition.  After
September 2001, Pakistani President Musharraf ended his government’s ties with the
Taliban regime of Afghanistan and has since cooperated with and contributed to U.S.
efforts to track and capture remnants of Al Qaeda and Taliban forces that have sought
refuge inside Pakistani territory.  Pakistan’s cooperation has been called “crucial” to
past and ongoing U.S. successes in the region, but there is growing concern that the
bilateral relationship is fragile and may be undermined by potentially disruptive
developments in the areas of weapons proliferation, democracy-building, and
Pakistan-India relations. 
Remaining proliferation- and democracy-related aid restrictions on Pakistan
were removed in the final months of 2001, and the United States continues to make
large aid donations to Pakistan and to support that country’s interests in negotiations
with international financial institutions.  There are concerns that October 2002
national elections in Pakistan were not sufficiently free and open by Western
standards and that the military-dominated government in Islamabad intends to remain
in power through manipulation of constitutional and democratic processes.  This
possibility led some Members of the 107th Congress to seek the renewal of aid
restrictions or a modification of the President’s waiver authority until such time that
a more robust democratic process is sustained and a civilian-led government
effectively is in place.  There also is concern that possibly growing anti-American
sentiment in Pakistan and the potential “re-Talibanization” of that country’s western
provinces bordering Afghanistan could adversely affect U.S. interests in the region.
During 2002, the United States took an increasingly direct, if low-profile, role
in both law enforcement and military operations being conducted on Pakistani
territory.  These operations have led to favorable results in tracking and apprehending
dangerous Islamic militants, but the activities of U.S. personnel in the country have
led to increasing signs of anti-American backlash and Pakistani sovereignty concerns.
Recent electoral gains by a coalition of Pakistani Islamist political parties are viewed
as an expression of such sentiments that may lead to reduced Pakistan-U.S.
cooperation in counterterrorism operations in the future.  The civilian Parliament and
Prime Minister that were seated in Islamabad in November 2002 may powerfully
influence the course and scope of future U.S. presence in the region.
This report reviews the status of Pakistan-U.S. anti-terrorism cooperation in the
areas of law enforcement, intelligence, and military operations.  U.S. arms transfers
to and security cooperation with Pakistan are also discussed.  A following section
addresses the major domestic repercussions of Pakistan-U.S. counterterrorism efforts,
the ways in which such efforts are perceived by newly-empowered Pakistan Islamists
and their followers, and the possible effects these dynamics may have on future
Pakistan-U.S. cooperation in this realm.  The final section assesses the overall status
of Pakistan-U.S. anti-terrorism cooperation and key points of U.S. concern.  Broader
discussion of bilateral relations and relevant legislation is found in IB94041,
Pakistan-U.S. Relations.  This report will be updated periodically.
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Pakistan is a key front-line ally in the U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalition, and the
Bush Administration has expressed satisfaction with ongoing Pakistan-U.S.
cooperation in this area.1  Top U.S. government officials regularly praise Pakistan
and its leadership for their “fine efforts” in joint counterterrorism operations, most
recently with the capture of suspected Al Qaeda leader Khalid Mohammed in the
Pakistani city of Rawalpindi on March 1, 2003.  Yet the bilateral relationship has
come under significant strain in recent months due to signs of growing U.S.
frustration with the continued existence of Islamic militants both along the Afghan-
Pakistani border and infiltrating into Indian-held Kashmir; doubts about the
commitment of Pakistan’s intelligence service to Islamabad’s stated anti-terrorism
policies; widespread anti-American sentiment in Pakistan; reports of alleged
Pakistani nuclear proliferation activities; continued perceived anti-democratic
practices in Islamabad; new U.S. immigration regulations; and continued antagonistic
relations between Islamabad and New Delhi.  
One senior observer reports that U.S. frustration with Islamabad grew
alarmingly high in the latter months of 2002.2  At the same time, suspicion of and
resentment toward the United States is reported to be spreading rapidly throughout
Pakistani society.3  A sense of the difficulties faced in pursuing U.S. policies in
Pakistan’s conservative Muslim western regions can be found in the March 2003
assertion by the spokesman for Pakistan’s largest Islamist party that captured alleged
Al Qaeda leader Khalid Mohammed is a “hero of Islam” and that there is “no reason
to believe that Al Qaeda really exists.”  Many Pakistanis reportedly believe that
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September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States were a ploy by Israel designed
to cause anti-Muslim backlash.4  For several years, analysts have discussed the
potential dangers to Pakistan and its people’s civil liberties  represented by increased
Islamization there.5  There are newer concerns that U.S. military action in Iraq may
fuel Islamic radicalism in Pakistan; March 2003 witnessed anti-U.S./anti-war
marches in Karachi, Lahore, and other cities organized by Islamist political parties
and involving as many as 250,000 demonstrators at a time.6
107th Congress
After the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, a previously
poor bilateral relationship with Pakistan was quickly improved.  On September 22,
2001, President Bush lifted all remaining nuclear proliferation-related sanctions on
Pakistan (and India).  The Congress then passed, and the President  signed into law,
S. 1465 (P.L. 107-57) in October 2001.  With this law, Congress exempted Pakistan
from all sanctions related to democracy and debt-arrearage for FY2002, and granted
the President authority to waive such sanctions through FY2003. Presidential
Determination 2003-16 exercised this authority for FY2003 on March 14, 2003.
Members of the 107th Congress introduced several Pakistan-related bills that
were not voted upon, including one that would authorize the President to reduce or
suspend duties on Pakistani textiles (S. 1675); one that would repeal the President’s
authority to waive economic sanctions and end assistance to Pakistan as a country
whose elected head of government was deposed by military coup (H.R. 5150); and
one that would require Presidential certification of Pakistan’s successful efforts to
halt cross-border terrorism into India, that the country’s national elections are
conducted freely and fairly, and that waivers on aid restrictions would facilitate both
U.S. anti-terror efforts and the transition to democratic rule in Pakistan (H.R. 5267).
During the final months of 2002, in response to reports alleging Pakistani
assistance to North Korea’s covert nuclear weapons program, a Member of Congress
urged reinstatement of proliferation-related aid restrictions pursuant to  P.L. 106-79,
Title IX.  A similar call was taken up in another Member’s February 2003 request
that the Bush Administration take “immediate steps” to ban all military sales to
Pakistan and reimpose proliferation-related sanctions under §669 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (the Symington Amendment).  However, in March 2003, the
Bush Administration announced that it had “carefully reviewed the facts relating to
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the possible transfer of nuclear technology from Pakistan to North Korea and decided
that they do not warrant the imposition of sanctions under applicable U.S. laws.”7 
108th Congress
Members of the 108th Congress may confront more proliferation- and
democracy-related aid issues with regard to Pakistan, as questions about Islamabad’s
possible nuclear technology transfers and about levels of democratic governance in
Pakistan continue to surface.8  Pakistan’s enthusiastic desire to purchase U.S.-made
weapons is likely to be an area of continuing congressional interest.  Trade-related
legislation may again arise, especially in the area of textile duties.9  U.S. assistance
to Pakistan rose steeply after September 2001, from about $10 million in FY2001 to
more than $1 billion in FY2002.  P.L. 108-7 includes authorization for Pakistan to
use $188 million in FY2003 Economic Support Funds to cancel approximately $1
billion in concessional debt to the U.S. government. The Bush Administration is
requesting bilateral assistance to Pakistan in the amounts of $305 million for FY2003
and $395 million for FY2004.10
Background
Prior to the September 2001 terror attacks on the United States, and especially
after Islamabad’s 1998 nuclear tests and 1999 military coup, U.S. relations with
Pakistan had become marked by discord and distance.  After the attacks, and under
intense diplomatic pressure, Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf made a swift
decision to end his government’s support for the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and
join the U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalition.  The United States and Pakistan now share
pressing interests in the region.  These chiefly are related to ending Islamic militancy
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that continues to wreak terror and destruction in South Asia and elsewhere, and that
poses a threat to the continued existence of moderate government in a nuclear-armed
Pakistan.
The policy reversal by Musharraf took place without the full support of the
country’s Islamic citizens or its military and intelligence organizations.  Islamabad
subsequently has asked the United States for military equipment, aid, and other forms
of security cooperation to both assist in the anti-terror campaign and in an effort to
maintain balance with India’s conventional forces.  Within Pakistan, however, a
negative political reaction is fueling anti-government and anti-American sentiment
that may jeopardize longer-term U.S. interests in the region.
A further complication is that the massive U.S. bombardment of Afghanistan’s
Tora Bora region in late-2001 and Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan’s eastern
Shah-i-Kot mountains in March 2002 apparently prompted two waves of up to 5,000
Al Qaeda fighters fleeing into Pakistan.11  Press reports indicate that Pakistan has
been allowing the United States to conduct low-level military or military support
operations in Pakistan’s western border regions since April 2002.12  U.S. efforts to
pursue counterterror operations in Pakistan are complicated by alleged assistance
given to the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and indigenous Pakistani terrorist groups by elements
of Pakistan’s powerful Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI).13  Anti-terrorism
operations may meet further obstacles if recently bolstered Pakistani Islamist political
parties succeed in exerting their anti-American influences on the country’s foreign
policy orientation.
The United States continues to make large aid donations to Pakistan and to
support that country’s interests in negotiations with international financial
institutions.  President Bush and Secretary of State Powell commonly refer to the
Islamabad regime as a “crucial ally.”  Yet there are concerns that 2002 national
elections in Pakistan were not sufficiently free and open by Western standards and
that the military-dominated government in Islamabad intends to remain in power
through manipulation of constitutional and democratic processes.  This possibility
has led some Members of Congress to seek the renewal of aid restrictions until such
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time that a more robust democratic process is sustained and a civilian-led government
is effectively in place.14  
At the same time, the very democratic process encouraged by the United States
may bring to power Islamist political groups that do not share some key U.S. interests
and concerns.  There is also possibly growing anti-American sentiment in Pakistan,
and the potential “re-Talibanization” of that country’s western  provinces bordering
Afghanistan could lead to a reduction of Pakistan-U.S. cooperation in
counterterrorism efforts, thereby harming U.S. interests in the region.15  Some
Islamist members of Pakistan’s national assembly have warned U.S. forces to stay
out of areas near the border with Afghanistan, and the provincial government of one
such region recently dropped the criminal charges that had been brought against
hundreds of Pakistani citizens for taking part in anti-U.S. demonstrations last year.16
It was reported that, following Pakistan’s October 2002 elections and the
ascension of an Islamist coalition there, U.S. officials presented to the Islamabad
government three policy priorities: 1) a preference that the Islamists not be included
in the ruling national coalition; 2) that provincial governments being run by Islamist
politicians not be allowed to interfere with ongoing anti-terror operations involving
U.S. personnel; and 3) that the basic understanding between the United States and
Pakistan – agreed to between Secretary of State Powell and President Musharraf on
September 14, 2001, and guaranteeing full Pakistani cooperation with the U.S.-led
anti-terror campaign – “must continue unhindered.”17
This report reviews the current status of Pakistan-U.S. anti-terrorism
cooperation in the areas of law enforcement, intelligence, and military operations.
U.S. arms transfers to and security cooperation with Pakistan are also discussed.  A
following section addresses the major domestic repercussions of Pakistan-U.S.
counterterrorism efforts, the ways in which such efforts are perceived by newly-
empowered Pakistan Islamists and their followers, and the possible effects these
dynamics may have on future Pakistan-U.S. cooperation in this realm.  The final
section assesses the overall status of Pakistan-U.S. anti-terrorism cooperation and key
points of U.S. concern.
Law Enforcement and Intelligence Cooperation
Pakistan historically has demonstrated inconsistency in its efforts to reign in
Islamic militants operating inside its borders.  The United States has long been aware
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concerns that anti-Western violence would escalate.  In September, 7 Pakistani Christians
were murdered execution-style at a charity office.  In October and November, parcel bombs
sent to police stations severely injured 10.  In December, a bomb at the Macedonian
consulate killed three.  In February 2003, a bomb killed one man outside the offices of
Pakistan’s state oil company and a barrage of automatic weapons fire at a Shiite mosque left
9 worshipers dead and another 9 wounded.  Later in the month, gunmen shot and killed two
Pakistani police officers outside the U.S. consulate; another five officers and a bystander
were wounded.  In a move praised by the U.S. government, Pakistan in January 2003
assigned 650 police officers to a new Diplomatic Protection Department created to reassure
foreign nationals in the wake of terrorist attacks in 2002 (Munir Ahmad, “Pakistan Deploys
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19 Shortly after the December 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament, Secretary of
State Powell designated the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed groups
as Foreign Terrorist Organizations under U.S. law.  Both the U.S. and Indian governments
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in an effort to “undermine peace and stability in South Asia and destroy relations between
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State Press Release, December 26, 2001).  In January 2003, the United States added to the
FTO list the Pakistan-based Lashkar-i-Jhangvi – a group held responsible for “numerous
deadly attacks in Pakistan,” including the January 2002 kidnaping and murder of Wall Street
of the existence of outlawed groups both in Pakistan-held Kashmir and within
Pakistani cities.  The government of neighboring India continues to call Pakistan the
“epicenter of global terrorism.”  In July 2000 testimony before the House
International Relations Committee, a senior U.S. counterterrorism official called
Pakistan’s record on combating terrorism “mixed,” noting that “Pakistan has
tolerated terrorists living and moving freely within its territory” and is believed to
have provided “material support for some of these militants, including the Harakat
ul-Mujahidin, a group that [the United States] has designated as an FTO [Foreign
Terrorist Organization].”  The official pointed to the role played by Islamic religious
schools, or madrassas, some of which “inculcate extremism and a violent anti-
Americanism in their students.”18
Pakistan’s tolerance of and support for hardline Islamists in both the country and
the region has been rooted in ethnic Pashtun ties that cross the Afghani-Pakistani
border and in former President Gen. Zia ul-Haq’s moves to strengthen Islamists
during the 1980s.  President Musharraf’s sweeping policy shift away from Islamic
extremism  began with the severing of all official ties to the Taliban in September
2001 and culminated in a landmark January 2002 speech in which he vowed to end
Pakistan’s use as a base for terrorism of any kind, criticized religious extremism and
intolerance in the country, and banned numerous militant groups, including Lashkar-
e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad (both blamed for terrorist violence in Kashmir and
India).19  The Islamabad government also instituted sweeping police reforms,
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upgraded its immigration control system, and began work on new anti-terrorist
finance laws.  In the wake of the speech, about 3,300 extremists were arrested and
detained, though at least one-third of these have since been released, including the
founders of both Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad.20
American military successes in Afghanistan in the final months of 2001
apparently ended the existence of Al Qaeda as a coherent entity in that country.  Yet
the first half of 2002 saw increasing indications that the group – along with its
Taliban cohorts – was making progress in regrouping, first in the tribal western
regions of Pakistan and later in major urban centers.  By late-2002, intelligence
analysts believed that Al Qaeda had established a new base of operations in the
sprawling city of Karachi, Pakistan’s most populous.  In early-2003, President
Musharraf shifted his previous stance and opined that Osama bin Laden himself may
be in Pakistan.21
In response, U.S. law enforcement agencies, led by the F.B.I., began in early
2002 to provide active assistance to Pakistan in its effort to hunt terrorists and their
allies.  The number of U.S. counterterrorism agents in Pakistan has been reported at
between “several dozen” and “the low hundreds.”22  While U.S. officials claim that
the involvement of American agents in field operations and raids has been quite
limited, senior Pakistani officials have indicated that F.B.I. agents participated in
numerous raids, where they “carry guns” and “help us break down doors.”23  Yet a
spokesman for the Pakistan Foreign Office stated in April 2002 that there exist “no
independent F.B.I. offices in Pakistan,” and Pakistan’s interior minister repeatedly
has claimed that F.B.I. operatives are not involved in hunting Al Qaeda supporters
in Pakistan.24
Director of Central Intelligence Tenet is reported to have made at least one trip
to Pakistan after September 2001, and the Islamabad government is said to be
cooperating with the C.I.A. in the ongoing hunt for Osama bin Laden, Mullah Omar,
and other top-level Islamic militant fugitives.25  There have been some concerns
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raised that U.S. counterterrorism agents, by working in tandem with Pakistani
security organizations that have been accused of human rights abuses including
extralegal deportation and torture, may share responsibility for any such abuses that
may be occurring.26  December 2002 press reports suggest that “stress and duress”
techniques used by the C.I.A. to interrogate suspected Al Qaeda and Taliban
members may be abusing human rights.  New York-based Human Rights Watch has
written a letter to President Bush calling for an investigation into what the rights
group alleges may be the use of torture by U.S. officials.27 
The February 2002 kidnaping and subsequent murder of Wall Street Journal
reporter Daniel Pearl is believed to have spurred an intensified U.S. focus on law
enforcement in Pakistan and efforts to assist local security forces in tracking and
capturing Islamic militants in that country’s urban centers.  Al Qaeda is believed by
U.S. officials to have assisted Pakistani militants in carrying out two deadly car
bombings in the spring of 2002:  a May attack that killed 14, including 11 French
military technicians, and a June explosion that killed 12 Pakistani nationals outside
the American consulate in Karachi.  Al Qaeda links also are suspected in numerous
other violent anti-Western and anti-Christian attacks in Pakistan.28 
On May 8, 2002, senior U.S. government officials from several executive-
branch agencies hosted the first meeting of the U.S.-Pakistan Joint Working Group
on Counterterrorism and Law Enforcement.  Pakistan’s Minister of Interior, Moin
Haider, led the Pakistani delegation.  The two governments discussed a broad range
of bilateral law enforcement issues, including counternarcotics, counterterrorism,
extradition, money laundering, trafficking in persons, demand reduction and drug
abuse control, alternative development and poppy eradication, police and legal
system reform, and issues related to the repatriation of Pakistani nationals detained
in the United States in connection with immigration proceedings.29  The two
governments agreed to strengthen their cooperation in each of these areas, and
ensuing trips to Pakistan by Deputy Secretary of State Armitage and Coordinator for
Counterterrorism Taylor marked a continuation of this process.  Officials from the
U.S. Departments of State and Justice met with Pakistani counterparts in Islamabad
in September 2002, and another full meeting of the U.S.-Pakistan Joint Working
Group on Counterterrorism and Law Enforcement is slated to take place in
Washington in April 2003.30
In November 2002, then-U.S. Treasury Secretary O’Neill met with top officials
in Islamabad to discuss Pakistan’s ongoing efforts to halt terrorist financing.  He
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stated that Pakistan was “leading the world” in the fight to eradicate money-
laundering, but some officials are more pessimistic.31  Islamabad has taken action
against at least 185 of the 247 U.S.-designated entities operating on Pakistani
territory, and has taken its own initiative to detain operatives and designate active
groups suspected of financing terrorist activities.  Yet Pakistan’s legal and regulatory
structures remain insufficient for a fully effective anti-terrorism financing regime,
especially with an inability to monitor the activities of foreign charities, and the
newly seated Assembly has yet to enact a proposed money laundering bill.  U.S.
officials continue to encourage stricter oversight and regulation, and the United
States has agreed to provide technical assistance and training to Pakistani customs
and finance officials as part of this effort.32
Notable Projects Underway
Supplemental FY2002 U.S. aid to Pakistan included $73 million in International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE) Emergency Response Funds that continue
to be used in FY2003 for border security and related law enforcement efforts.33  The
United States reportedly has supplied numerous instruments to bolster Pakistani
security forces, including five used transport helicopters, 750 short- and long-range
radios, and 434 vehicles (trucks, tractors, SUVs, and motorcycles) to increase
mobility.  During her December 2002 visit to Islamabad, Assistant Secretary of State
for South Asia Rocca announced the provision to Pakistan of some 8,000 pieces of
sophisticated communication and surveillance equipment worth more than $4
million.  The equipment is to be used in efforts to track down suspected terrorists and
those involved in drug trafficking.  Also, the United States is undertaking to train
Pakistani police investigators and is helping to establish a national fingerprint
database modeled on that of the F.B.I.  In March 2003, the United States disbursed
to Pakistan $10 million for the Criminal Information Database, along with nearly $20
million more for road-building projects in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.
The roads are expected to improve access for law enforcement and security
personnel, as well as bolster the region’s economy.34 
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In what may become the most ambitious integrated national identification
system ever installed, the United States reportedly is supplying to Pakistan the
Personnel Identification Secure Comparison Evaluation System (PISCES).  This
computer software is said to make real-time comparisons of photographs and other
personal details with the F.B.I. database in order to track the movements of Islamic
militants.  The ultimate aim is to monitor travelers entering or leaving Pakistan at all
18 major transit points.  The system is reported to be in place at Karachi, Islamabad,
and Lahore airports, and is expected to soon be operational at airports in Quetta and
Peshawar, as well.35 
Key Arrests
It is through the provision of intelligence that American agents are reported to
be making their greatest contributions to such operations as those noted below.36  The
interception and tracing of satellite telephone transmissions has been a key tool in
joint U.S.-Pakistani efforts to capture fugitive Taliban and Al Qaeda forces in
Pakistan.  American agents also closely monitor email and other Internet traffic for
signs of terrorist communications.  The F.B.I. is reported to have trained and
equipped a number of former Pakistani army officers and others in what is known as
the “Spider Group,” an informal intelligence-gathering unit that is especially focused
on monitoring the activities of Pakistani Islamist groups.37   
U.S. government efforts to assist Pakistan with counterterrorism and law
enforcement have produced many positive results.  U.S. law enforcement personnel
are reported to have played vital and direct, if low-profile roles in each of the
following operations:38
! In March 2002, Abu Zubaydah, believed to be Al Qaeda’s field
commander, was shot and captured while trying to flee a raid in the
Pakistani city of Faisalabad.  He is said to have provided abundant
intelligence to American authorities.  Also that month, an F.B.I.
agent was asked by the Pakistan government to provide sworn
testimony to help in the prosecution of Daniel Pearl’s kidnappers.
Finally, in the eastern cities of Faisalabad and Lahore, a major raid
netted 26 suspected Al Qaeda and Taliban fugitives.
! In June, 8 suspected members of banned extremist organizations
were captured in Lahore.
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! In July, 10 “Arab mujahideen” – alleged escapees from Kohat –
were arrested in Hyderabad.
! In August, an office used by Harakat-ul-Mujahideen, a group linked
to Al Qaeda, was raided, resulting in the arrest of 12 suspected
militants and the seizure of explosives and other incriminating
evidence.
! In September,  Ramzi bin al-Shibh, said to be a key figure in the
planning of the September 2001 terror attacks on the United States,
and Sharib Ahmad, the most-wanted militant in Pakistan and alleged
organizer of the June 2002 car bomb attack on the U.S. consulate in
Karachi, were both apprehended.  Later in the month, two Algerian
nationals believed to be Al Qaeda members were arrested in
Karachi, bringing to 10 the number of Algerians apprehended over
a two-day period.
! In October, a raid on a refugee camp near Peshawar netted four
suspected Al Qaeda operatives.  Days later, a pre-dawn raid on
another refugee camp led to the capture of five suspected militants
wanted in connection with a spate of terror attacks on Pakistani
Christians, as well as Khan Mohammad, said to be security chief for
renegade Afghani warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.  Later in the
month, FBI agents interrogated a physician who admitted to treating
Osama bin Laden and collaborating with Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.
! In December, two tribesmen from Pakistan’s South Waziristan
Agency were handed over to U.S. agents for interrogation for their
alleged involvement in an attack on a U.S. military camp in
Afghanistan.  Later in the month, a joint raid by Pakistani police and
F.B.I. agents netted 9 suspected Al Qaeda operatives, including two
naturalized American citizens.
! In January 2003, Pakistani police and F.B.I. agents arrested three
suspected Al Qaeda operatives after a gunfight on the outskirts of
Karachi.  Computers, grenades, and $30,000 in U.S. currency were
recovered.  Among the nine suspects arrested in December was a
Pakistani doctor, Ahmed Khawaja, who is named in January, and
then charged along with his brother in February, as having provided
material assistance to numerous Al Qaeda figures.
! On March 1, Khalid Mohammed, alleged mastermind of the
September 2001 terrorist attacks and close associate of bin Laden,
was arrested along with two cohorts in a pre-dawn raid in
Rawalpindi.  The efforts of U.S. communications specialists
reportedly were key to locating the suspects.  Seized at the scene
were computer and communications equipment that are said to
provide a “trove” of valuable data on Al Qaeda’s methods of
operations, support networks, and finances.  One week after, 10 Al
Qaeda suspects were arrested in Peshawar, including one believed
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to have had recent contact with Osama bin Laden.  Later in March,
police arrested alleged Al Qaeda financier and communications
operative Yassir al-Jaziri in Lahore.  This arrest appears to have
provided leads resulting in the arrest of 6 more suspected Al Qaeda
militants near Lahore and two in Peshawar on March 17.
The arrest of Khalid Mohammed in early March spurred heightened speculation
that Osama bin Laden’s capture was imminent.  The White House called
Mohammed’s capture a “joint operation” between Pakistani and U.S. authorities and
President Bush expressed his “deep appreciation and gratitude to President Musharraf
and to the government of Pakistan” for their “fine efforts” in combating terrorism.39
In the wake of the announced capture, rumors abounded that the ISI had known of
Mohammed’s whereabouts for weeks or even months before and that they may have
staged the videotaped seizure that was shown to reporters.40  In mid-March,
Pakistan’s intelligence agency claimed to have captured 442 foreign nationals
suspected of terrorist activities and to have remanded 346 of these to U.S. custody
(at least 36 have been transferred to other countries and more than 50 released
without charge) since September 2001.41 
Cooperation in Military Operations
Pakistan has served as a vital basing and transit point for Operation Enduring
Freedom, the U.S.-led anti-terror mission in Afghanistan.  According to the U.S.
Department of Defense, Pakistan is providing basing and overflight permission for
all United States and coalition forces engaged in Afghanistan.  The airbase near
Jacobabad has been vital to U.S. military operations in the region, and the airport of
Dalbandin, near the Afghan border, is a key forward operational base.  More than
57,000 U.S. military sorties have originated on Pakistani territory.  U.S. military
personnel reportedly have installed extensive radar facilities at three Pakistani
airfields, allowing for coverage of the entire Pakistani airspace.  Pakistan also
deployed more than 115,000 regular and paramilitary troops along the tribal belt
bordering Afghanistan and Iran in support of U.S.-led efforts to capture Taliban and
Al Qaeda fugitives (many of the regular army troops were redeployed to the Pakistan-
India border during a 10-month period of heightened tensions between Islamabad and
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New Delhi from December 2001-October 2002).  Some 45,000 Pakistani troops were
reported to be actively supporting Operation Enduring Freedom as of October 2002.42
Reports indicate that U.S. special operations soldiers and C.I.A. paramilitary
agents participate in operations on Pakistani territory at the company-level (small
teams of American specialists accompany much larger Pakistani units).43  These
reports are not confirmed by either Washington or Islamabad, as both governments
make no official statements about such joint operations.  The presence and activities
of U.S. military personnel in Pakistan is a subject of great sensitivity in both capitals.
Officially, there is only a handful of U.S. troops operating on Pakistani territory.  In
order to blend in with Pakistani military units, American special forces personnel are
said to all be of medium-height, Pashto-speaking, and wearing Pakistani Army
uniforms.44
A July 2002 press report stated that more than 3,500 Al Qaeda operatives
crossed into Pakistan while fleeing U.S. military operations in neighboring
Afghanistan.  There is continuing concern that these militants intend to establish a
permanent presence in Pakistani cities.45  In August, a U.S. military assessment
estimated the presence of up to 1,000 Al Qaeda fighters in Pakistan, spurring the top
officer of the U.S. Central Command, Gen. Tommy Franks, and Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld to suggest that the successful continuation of his Afghanistan mission
would require expanding U.S. military operations into “neighboring countries.”46  His
statement was met with adamant Pakistani assertions that any U.S. troop presence on
their territory is “out of the question” given the professed sufficiency of ongoing
Pakistani security operations.47  U.S. military operations in Afghanistan extremely
close to the Pakistan border and employing thousands of troops have been ongoing.48
In this mountainous region, the location of the international border is not always
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clear, but there remain no confirmed open-source reports of large-scale American
troop movements or aerial sorties in Pakistani territory.49  
Pakistani government officials have issued contradictory statements on the issue
of Al Qaeda’s presence in their country, but many have flatly denied that Al Qaeda
forces have entered Pakistan in any but the smallest numbers.  In September 2002,
a senior Pakistani security official claimed that his forces had “broken the back” of
Al Qaeda in the country,50 but more recent pronouncements have been less assured:
after acknowledging that Al Qaeda members are in hiding throughout the country,
the chief of Karachi’s police investigation department stated in December 2002 that
Al Qaeda is “down, but not out” in Pakistan.  It is estimated that up to 5,000 Al
Qaeda and Taliban fighters are still on the loose in the North West Frontier Province
(NWFP) alone.51  
Press reports in early 2003 suggested that Al Qaeda and Taliban forces have
regrouped on Pakistani territory near the Afghani border in preparation for spring
offensive operations against U.S.-led coalition units in Afghanistan.52  More recently,
however, the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee claimed that the March
arrest of Khalid Mohammed likely would preclude any planned Al Qaeda offensive,
and a U.S. military spokesman was quoted as saying he does not expect a spring
offensive by Al Qaeda because he does not think there is “that much spring in
them.”53
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Arms Sales
Almost immediately upon joining the U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalition in
September 2001, the Pakistani government sought compensation for its support,
primarily through economic aid, debt forgiveness, and renewed access to
sophisticated U.S. weaponry.  The transfer to Pakistan of U.S. military equipment
was ended in 1990 when then-President Bush could no longer certify that Pakistan
was not pursuing a nuclear weapons program.  U.S. economic sanctions triggered by
Pakistan’s May 1998 nuclear tests and October 1999 military coup were waived by
President George W. Bush and new legislation in October 2001,54 spurring Islamabad
to present Washington with a “wish list” that was reported to have included a variety
of missiles, artillery and rocket launching systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, and the
release of previously purchased F-16 jets.  An unnamed Pakistani defense ministry
source was quoted as saying, “We want the kind of relationship the United States has
with Egypt in terms of weapons sales.”55  In the lead-up to his January 2003 visit to
the United States, Pakistani Foreign Minister Kasuri urged the United States to “take
steps to reduce the conventional weapons disparity” between Pakistan and India as
a means of halting a nuclear arms race in South Asia.56
There have been numerous foreign press reports, along with Pakistani and
Indian government officials’ claims, that Islamabad has secured deals for the
purchase of major U.S. weapons platforms, including F-16s fighter jets, P-3 maritime
surveillance aircraft, and Harpoon anti-ship missiles.  Yet, as of late March 2003, the
Bush Administration has notified Congress of only two pending transfers:  the first,
dated July 16, 2002, involves seven used C-130E  transport aircraft (one being for
spare parts); the second, dated July 26, 2002, is for six Aerostats – sophisticated,
balloon-mounted surveillance radars.  These mark the first noteworthy arms sales to
Pakistan in more than a decade and reportedly are intended to support Islamabad’s
ability both to move troops quickly and to detect infiltration (thus aiding in
counterterror operations).  
Pakistan lately has emphasized a perceived need to bolster its air forces, if not
through acquisition of new F-16s then at least through the receipt of spare parts and
weaponry for its existing fleet of 1970s-era F-16A fighters (many of which are
grounded for want of maintenance and munitions).57  While most of Pakistan’s
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Gen. Franks returned to Islamabad in January 2003 for a series of “routine consultations”
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France-Presse, January 27, 2003).
61 “Security-related programs” are Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military
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Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR), and
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO).  FY2002 assistance included $220 million in PKO funds.
arsenal is of Chinese origin, major U.S.-made weapons systems include P-3 Orion
and C-130 Hercules aircraft, Harpoon and Stinger missiles, and 155mm howitzers.
Past U.S.-imposed sanctions have caused many of these systems to become
inoperable.58
Security Cooperation
The long-moribund Pakistan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Group (DCG) – created
to oversee a bilateral defense relationship that has existed since the 1950s – met in
Pakistan in late September 2002.  This was the first such meeting since 1997.  The
two-day session included discussions among working groups on military cooperation,
security assistance, and anti-terrorism.  A joint statement issued by the DCG reports
that the meetings “served the purpose of providing a forum to exchange views on
security matters and, in Pakistan’s case, share with the United States its views of its
security environment.”59
October 2002 saw the first joint U.S.-Pakistan military exercises in nearly five
years, with approximately 120 soldiers from each country coming together in
Pakistan for “Inspired Gambit III.”  U.S. Central Commander Gen. Tommy Franks
witnessed the event.  As with recent joint U.S.-Indian military exercises, an emphasis
was placed upon increasing interoperability in weapon systems and tactics.60
Numerous Pakistani press reports in early 2003 claimed that further joint exercises
were being planned, but these reports are not confirmed by the U.S. government.
U.S. assistance to Pakistan under security-related programs includes $396.5 million
distributed in FY2002, $56.5 million allocated for FY2003, and $120 million
requested for FY2004.61
As a current rotating member of the UN Security Council (UNSC), the Pakistani
government faced a dilemma in addressing early-2003 discussions related to Iraq.
Islamabad’s external role as a key U.S. ally and member of the U.S.-led
counterterrorism effort came up against powerful domestic opposition to Pakistan’s
participation in or condoning of a war against another Muslim country.  So great
were the countervailing pressures that most analysts foresaw a Pakistani abstention
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on a potential UNSC Res. 1442, but the vote never came.  Upon the initiation of
U.S.-led military operations against Iraq in March 2003, Islamabad called the war
“unjustified” and vowed to oppose it in all fora, while nearly all Pakistani opposition
parties – religious and secular, alike – were harshly critical of U.S. policy.62
Domestic Repercussions in Pakistan
November 2002 saw the formation of a fragile, pro-Musharraf ruling coalition
in Islamabad, and President Musharraf ostensibly has turned day-to-day governance
of the country over to civilian politicians.63  The composition and actual level of
influence exerted by the National Assembly and Prime Minister Zafarullah Jamali
may have significant impact on future Pakistan-U.S. security relations in general and
on U.S. counterterrorism efforts in South and Southwest Asia in particular.  Thus far,
the new civilian government in Islamabad has stated that it will “fulfill all its
commitments to the international community in the fight against terrorism” and that
“the policies initiated by President Pervez Musharraf will be continued.”64  A rough
estimate indicates that regional anti-terrorism efforts have caused the Pakistani
economy losses in excess of $10 billion since October 2001.65
President Musharraf’s cooperation with U.S.-led anti-terrorism efforts is widely
recognized as placing him in a precarious circumstance between external pressures
to uphold pledges to eliminate Al Qaeda, Taliban, and Kashmiri separatist militants
operating from Pakistani soil on the one hand, and internal pressures to maintain
foreign policy independence, support for Kashmiri freedom, and even Islamic
cohesion on the other. A February 2003 report indicates that Musharraf survived at
least 6 assassination attempts during 2002, and notes that the risk of a coup staged
by “senior-ranking” Pakistani military officials who disapprove of his relationship
with the West cannot be ruled out.66  The latter development could place Pakistan’s
nuclear arsenal of up to 75 warheads in the hands of Islamic extremists.  In March
2003, large-scale  street demonstrations organized by Islamist parties, combined with
persistent calls by opposition political figures that Musharraf drop his “illegal”
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package of constitutional amendments and resign his post as Army Chief, are said by
many to be making the Pakistani government “extremely uncomfortable.”67
Sovereignty Concerns
The escalation of U.S. military involvement in anti-terrorism operations in
western Pakistan apparently  has brought some positive results and probably keeps
Al Qaeda and Taliban remnants off-balance, but a negative political reaction within
Pakistan is fueling anti-government and anti-American sentiments that may
jeopardize longer-term U.S. interests in the region.  An apparent breakdown of the
long-standing autonomy of Pakistan’s tribal zone along the border with Afghanistan,
combined with an unprecedented U.S. military presence in the country, is reported
to be causing increased anger and resentment among the ethnic Pashtun majority
there.  Likewise, the presence of American law enforcement agents in Pakistani cities
is seen to be having similar effects among middle- and upper-class urban Pakistanis.
The Islamabad government has attempted to assuage this negative political
response.  Pakistani ballistic missile tests in early October 2002 were viewed as both
a pre-election message of continued hawkishness vis-a-vis Kashmir and India, and
a demonstration of foreign policy independence from the United States, given
Washington’s expressed displeasure at any signs of arms race dynamics in the region.
The presence in Pakistan of U.S. law enforcement and military personnel, and the
arrest and extradition of several Pakistani nationals, have spurred frequent
expressions of sovereignty concerns, especially by leaders of the Muttahida Majlis-e-
Amal (MMA), a coalition of six leading Islamist parties.  In late-2002 and early-
2003:  
! the president of the Peshawar Bar Association described Pakistan as
having become “a U.S. colony;” 
! senior legal figures in Baluchistan have complained that F.B.I.
operations in that region are “clear violations of the Pakistani
constitution;” 
! MMA Secretary-General Maulana Rehman made a declaration of
“jihad against America that has stationed its forces in Pakistan to do
away with our sovereignty;”
! top MMA chief Liaquat Baloch demanded that all Americans living
in Pakistan should be fingerprinted and tested for AIDS;
! the MMA vice president stated that police forces in the NWFP and
Baluchistan had been instructed to comply only with the orders of
their provincial governments and not with those given by any U.S.
agencies;
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! and reports that F.B.I. agents had raided several mosques and
madrassas in the Pakistani capital elicited complaints and warnings
from Islamic clerics that such raids would lead to a “direct clash.”68
The Pakistani government also has been critical of the newly-instituted U.S.
policy of fingerprinting and photographing all Pakistani men who enter the United
States, considering the policy unwarranted and “discriminatory” against the citizens
of a U.S. ally.  Islamabad formally requested that the United States remove Pakistan
from the list of 20 nations subject to such immigration restrictions, with Pakistani
Foreign Minister Kasuri warning that his country’s presence on the new U.S.
registration list could destabilize the Islamabad government and bolster the cause of
radicals in Pakistan.  Secretary of State Powell responded by assuring Kasuri that the
United States is “very sensitive” to Pakistani concerns on this issue and emphasizing
that the registration program “is not something directed at Pakistan or directed at
Muslims or directed at Pakistanis in America”69  The issue reflects a growing
perception in Pakistan that the United States maintains a double-standard of friendly
relations with the Islamabad government and “adversarial” relations with the
Pakistani people.
Islamist Sentiments
Negative repercussions also were manifest in Pakistan’s October 2002 national
elections.  The polls resulted in unexpectedly strong showings for candidates of the
United Action Forum (known as MMA in its Urdu-language acronym), a coalition
of six Islamic parties that ran on what largely was an anti-American platform and that
won 68 seats – about 20% of the total – in the national assembly.  The MMA also
controls the provincial assembly in the North West Frontier Province and leads the
coalition running that in Baluchistan (the two Pashtun-majority regions which border
Afghanistan).  This circumstance has led to concerns that a major shift in Pakistan’s
foreign policy may be in the offing, most especially with renewed indications of the
“Talibanization” of western border regions.  Yet anti-Americanism as expressed
through support for Islamic parties is not limited to the rural western regions;
religious candidates won parliamentary seats in Islamabad, Lahore, and Karachi, and
resentment of perceived U.S. support for what are called President Musharraf’s anti-
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democratic practices and military dictatorship has arisen even among Pakistan’s
monied elite.70
Leading Islamist politicians in Pakistan reportedly have made numerous
provocative comments since coming to power.  One senior MMA leader stated that
“Taliban and Al Qaeda members are our brothers.”  MMA parliamentary leader Qazi
Hussain Ahmed has threatened that, if Musharraf supported any U.S. military action
against Iraq, “the MMA will make the government unmanageable.”  During prayers
on the floor of the Pakistani Parliament for a Pakistani national recently executed in
Virginia for two murders outside the CIA headquarters in 1993, a senior MMA
member stated that, “America is the biggest terrorist state.”  In the first days of
January 2003, the chief of Jamat al-Daawa – one of 6 MMA coalition parties –
asserted his belief that “all anti-Muslim forces including the United States are trying
to paralyze the Muslims economically, socially, and politically all over the world.”
MMA leader Maulana Mahmood stated later in the month that Pakistan’s opposition
groups will “break America into pieces like Russia” and “erase America from the
world.”71  Anti-American sentiment is notably more virulent in Pakistan’s Urdu-
language press, where references to an alleged Christian-Jewish assault on Islam and
the “traitorous” status of Pakistan’s Western-allied leadership are more explicit.72 
Along with Islamist expressions of anger at the United States and the
Musharraf-Jamali government’s current alliance with it, there are plentiful signs of
efforts underway to “re-Talibanize” Pashtun-majority areas near the Afghani-
Pakistani border.  In 2003, MMA lawmakers in the NWFP have pledged to accelerate
the process of Islamization in the region, and have made requests that the federal
government grant them the authority to impose harsh penalties under Sharia, such as
amputating the hands of thieves and stoning adulterers, as well as severely limiting
women’s freedoms.  The seizure and burning of books and videotapes deemed
“pornographic” has become common; numerous carnivals and theaters have been
shut down.  Even a leading Muslim separatist group in India’s Jammu and Kashmir
state has criticized Pakistan for the “Talibanization” of Indian Kashmir by sending
jihadis across the Line of Control.73
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Although the MMA did enjoy a strong showing in October 2002 elections,
Pakistani government officials repeatedly have stated that Islamabad’s foreign policy
will remain unchanged.  Moreover, Pakistan does have a small, but politically active
middle-class, as well as a notable camp of moderate political figures who seek to
establish a firm middle ground between the perceived poles of secular military
dictatorship and the institution of Islamic rule.  These figures often root their ideas
in the writings of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Pakistan’s founding father and proponent
of a moderate and democratic Islamic republic.  To date, such moderate views
usually have been outweighed by militarist influences and/or the perception of
widespread corruption among Pakistan’s civilian politicians, which have fostered
political polarization.
Assessment and U.S. Concerns
In March 2003, a top U.S. diplomat stated that U.S.-Pakistan relations are both
“significantly broadened” and “solid.”  She called Pakistan-U.S. anti-terrorism
cooperation “excellent” and “100 percent solid,” and noted that “Pakistan has
apprehended close to 500 suspected Al Qaeda operatives and affiliates.”74   However,
while the U.S. State Department and White House continue to be almost wholly
positive in their pronouncements  relevant to Pakistani cooperation, the first months
of 2003 have seen increasing expressions of U.S. doubts and concerns, emanating
especially from top military and congressional leaders.  Specific issues most
commonly raised regard the continuation of Islamist militant infiltration into Indian
Kashmir, the continued presence in Pakistan of wanted terrorists and illegal terrorist
groups, and the extent to which Pakistan’s government and its intelligence apparatus
are committed to Islamabad’s stated anti-terrorism policies.  
In an unusually strong rebuke, U.S. Ambassador to Islamabad Nancy Powell
stated in January that Pakistan is being used as a “platform for terrorism” and that
this must stop.  Later in the month, an unnamed U.S. State Department official was
quoted as saying that the amount of infiltration of Islamic militants across the Line
of Control into Indian Kashmir was increasing and that Pakistan was not doing
enough to halt it.75  Leading U.S. military commanders overseeing Operation
Enduring Freedom have complained that renegade Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters are
able to attack coalition troops in Afghanistan then escape across the Pakistani
frontier.  They have expressed dismay at the “slow pace of progress” in capturing
wanted fugitives, especially Taliban leaders, in Pakistan and have urged Pakistan to
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“do more” to secure its rugged western border area.76  The U.S. Special Envoy to
Afghanistan Khalilzad stated in February that, “There are some key Taliban figures
in Pakistan ... some Al Qaeda people in the border areas” and that the U.S.
government “will not accept” these individuals being allowed to “find refuge” in
Pakistan.77  In the same month, the two senior members of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee – Sen. Lugar and Sen. Biden – expressed “deep concern” that
“elements of Pakistan’s powerful Inter-Services Intelligence agency might be helping
members of the Taliban and Al Qaeda operate along the border and infiltrate into
Afghanistan.”78
In a security-related matter that may affect future Pakistan-U.S. anti-terrorism
cooperation, late-2002 and early-2003 press reports citing U.S. intelligence officials
indicated that Pakistan appears to have provided nuclear weapons-related
technologies to North Korea beginning in the late-1990s and possibly continuing
through July 2002.79  Subsequent reports suggest that Iran’s nuclear program may
also have benefitted from Pakistani assistance in the past.80 Islamabad adamantly
denies that any such transfers have occurred.  In October 2002, Musharraf gave
Secretary of State Powell a “400% assurance” that such transfers to North Korea are
“not taking place now.”  When asked about past transfers, Secretary Powell said,
“The past is the past and there isn’t a whole lot I can do about it.”  In March 2003,
the Bush Administration declared that it had “carefully reviewed the facts relating to
the possible transfer of nuclear technology from Pakistan to North Korea, and
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decided that they do not warrant the imposition of sanctions under applicable U.S.
laws.”81
Congressional oversight of U.S.-Pakistan relations in a March 2003 hearing of
the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the House International Relations
Committee included Member expressions of concern about possible links between
Al Qaeda and Pakistan’s largest Islamic party; about Musharraf’s possibly continuing
support for “Kashmiri terrorists;” about the possibility that “lower-level operatives
within the ISI” may be assisting Al Qaeda and Taliban fugitives; about possible ISI
involvement in regional heroin trafficking; about Pakistan’s possible nuclear
weapons proliferation activities and “contradictions” in U.S. nonproliferation policy
toward the region; about the role madrassas play in raising levels of Islamic
radicalism in Pakistan; and about problems with Pakistani democratization and the
danger of the United States “giving full recognition to a military coup” through
continuous waivers of democracy-related aid restrictions.82  
Pakistan-U.S. anti-terrorism cooperation has been broad in both scale and scope,
and has realized tangible successes since October 2001.  Yet the wide range of U.S.
concerns about relations with Pakistan indicate that such partnership between the two
countries may be undermined.  A reduction of U.S. cooperative efforts could result
from increased indications of suboptimal levels of Pakistani commitment or from
exacerbated Pakistan-India tensions that are linked to infiltration in Kashmir.
Differences over weapons proliferation and human rights violations could trigger far-
reaching restrictions on future U.S. aid to Pakistan.  The Islamabad government, for
its part, may come under increasing pressure to adjust its foreign policy to more
accurately reflect the sentiments of Pakistan’s opposition parties, especially the
virulently anti-Western Islamists.  This could erode Pakistani cooperative efforts and
is made even more likely as domestic violence and public disturbances in Pakistan
continue.  Given such numerous and substantial potential disruptions to present
levels of Pakistan-U.S. anti-terrorism cooperation, it may be unwise to assume that
such cooperation is sustainable in the middle- and long-term.
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Note: Boundary representations not necessarily authoritative.
